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One of the challenges for perceptually grounded accounts of high-level cognition is to
explain how people make connections and draw inferences between situations that super-
ﬁcially have little in common. Evidence suggests that people draw these connections even
without having explicit, verbalizable knowledge of their bases. Instead, the connections
are based on sub-symbolic representations that are grounded in perception, action, and
space. One reason why people are able to spontaneously see relations between situations
that initially appear to be unrelated is that their eventual perceptions are not restricted to
initial appearances. Training and strategic deployment allow our perceptual processes to
deliver outputs thatwould have otherwise required abstract or formal reasoning. Evenwith-
out people having any privileged access to the internal operations of perceptual modules,
these modules can be systematically altered so as to better serve our high-level reason-
ing needs. Moreover, perceptually based processes can be altered in a number of ways
to closely approximate formally sanctioned computations. To be concrete about mecha-
nisms of perceptual change, we present 21 illustrations of ways in which we alter, adjust,
and augment our perceptual systems with the intention of having them better satisfy our
needs.
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IMPROVING PERCEPTION TO MAKE DISTANT CONNECTIONS
CLOSER
One of the prime indicators of sophisticated cognition is that it
does not rely on superﬁcial resemblances to make connections
between situations. Whereas a novice physicist may group sce-
narios based on surface properties such as whether springs or
inclined planes are involved, the expert instead groups problems
on the basis of the deep law of physics required for solution, such
as Newton’s second law or conservation of energy (Chi et al.,
1981). Whereas a child typically connects clouds to sponges via
surface features such as “round and ﬂuffy,” a more experienced
adult may refer to more sophisticated relations such as “stores,
and then releases water” (Gentner, 1988), allowing the adult to
see connections among clouds, sponges, cisterns, and reservoirs.
Scientists armed with the notion of a negative feedback system can
see a resemblance between toilets, heat regulation, and predator–
prey dynamics – namely, that each has two variables that are
related such that increases to x cause increases to y which, in
turn, cause decreases to x (Goldstone and Wilensky, 2008). Even
though these scenarios have little in common with one another
at ﬁrst sight, sophisticated cognitive processes unite these situ-
ations because they share deep properties that crucially govern
their behavior.
One moral that could be drawn from these examples is that
perceptual resemblances must be cast aside if one is to procure
the sophisticated categories and inferences of a scientist, mathe-
matician, or domain expert. This is precisely the moral drawn by
Quine (1977) when he wrote, “I shall suggest that it is a mark of
maturity of a branch of science that the notion of similarity or
kind ﬁnally dissolves, so far as it is relevant to that branch of sci-
ence. That is, it ultimately submits to analysis in the special terms
of that branch of science and logic” (p. 160). The sort of example
that Quine has in mind is a natural kind such as gold. Prior to
the discovery of atomic elements, observers presumably noticed
that several geological samples resembled each other, and used the
term “gold” to refer to the collection of similar objects. However,
once the elemental composition of gold was identiﬁed, surface
features like “yellow,”“malleable,” and “shiny”were no longer nec-
essary for identifying an object as gold. Advantages of supplanting
these surface features with the chemical feature “atomic number
79” are that the chemical feature offers the promise of a scien-
tiﬁc causal account for why gold has the surface features that it
does, and it provides a way of excluding objects like pyrite (“fool’s
gold”) from the category of gold despite its possession of some of
gold’s surface features. Perceptual resemblances can be mislead-
ing, and a sophisticated cognizer learns when to disregard these
resemblances.
Another possibility is that perceptual resemblances are not
ﬁxed,and thatwemay adapt our perceptions so as to better support
the requirements of categories and inferences that are important
for us. Another way, then, of becoming a sophisticated cognizer
is to modify one’s perceptual processes to generate categories and
inferences that are consonant with those that are formally sanc-
tioned. In what follows, we ﬁrst describe empirical evidence that
people can and do change their perceptual processes in this way.
We then describe mechanisms for this perceptual plasticity, with a
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particular eye toward exploring the cognitive penetrability of these
perceptual adaptations.
MAKING DISTANT CONNECTIONS
The examples of high-level cognition described above have a com-
monality – they all involve making connections between appar-
ently distant scenarios, and/or splitting apart apparently similar
scenarios. For example, an informed chemist connects a gold
nugget to liquid gold dissolved in an alkaline solution, and differ-
entiates it frompyrite.Oneway to draw inferentially productive yet
distant connections is to equip oneself with an appropriate theory.
This is the approach pursued by Quine (1977; see also, Goodman,
1972). A recently growing body of psychological evidence indi-
cates a second way that is grounded in perception and action.
Researchers in language, transfer, analogy, and cognition have
found cases of people drawing connections between situations
that do not seem to be superﬁcially related. Much of this research
has been associated with embodied and grounded cognition, an
approach that argues that cognition is grounded in perception and
action processes, rather than being associated with purely formal,
amodal processing (Barsalou, 2008). This is an intriguing connec-
tion because of the prime facie tension between grounded accounts
of cognition and connections being drawn that are not supported
by perception. If cognition is inherently grounded in perception,
then how are these superﬁcially distant connections being made?
IMPLICIT ANALOGICAL TRANSFER VIA PERCEPTUAL PRIMING
One possible answer is provided by an experiment on transfer of
learning by Day and Goldstone (2011). Their participants inter-
acted with two systems that were superﬁcially dissimilar, but both
required participants to apply forces that either reinforced or
opposed the system’s natural resonance. The ﬁrst scenario (see
Figure 1), featured an oscillating ball suspended between two ver-
tical poles by a rubber bands. If the ball is displaced to the right
of center, then the red rubber band on the left will pull the ball
back to the left. If the ball is displaced to the left, then the blue
rubber band on the right will pull the ball back to the right. Given
the absence of friction in the system, any perturbation of the ball’s
horizontal position leads to an undampened oscillation. The par-
ticipants are able to apply a rightward force to the ball via a fan
positioned on the left side of apparatus and facing to the right. By
timing when the fan is turned on, the participants’ task is either
to stabilize the ball at the apparatus’midpoint without movement,
or to get the ball to reach the extreme right side of the apparatus,
as indicated by the checkered triangle in Figure 1. A Flash imple-
mentation of the simulation can be accessed at http://cognitrn.
psych.indiana.edu/complexsims/Oscillatingball.html. To solve the
stabilize task, the participants should turn on the fan whenever the
ball is moving to the left, regardless of the ball’s horizontal posi-
tion. To solve the extremitize task, the participants should turn on
the fan whenever the ball is moving to the right, so as to reinforce
the ball’s own movement.
After exploring this ﬁrst simulation for several minutes, par-
ticipants are given a second task without any indication of its
relation to the ﬁrst task. In this task, participants assume the role
of mayor of a city. Whenever the population of the city is higher
than 500,000, there is an intrinsic tendency for the population
FIGURE 1 |Two superficially dissimilar scenarios instantiating the
same principle of reinforcing forces in a resonating system, as studied
by Day and Goldstone (2011).
to decrease because of overcrowding, trafﬁc jams, and expensive
housing. Whenever the population is less than 500,000, there is
a tendency for the population to increase because of living ease
and inexpensive housing. Participants are given one of two goals
as mayor: to stabilize the population at 500,000 citizens with-
out ﬂuctuation, or to make the population reach 1,000,000. To
achieve these goals, participants can strategically deploy “media
campaigns.” At the beginning of each discrete year of the sim-
ulation, participants decide whether they will initiate a media
campaign that adds a positive constant to the natural annual
change (velocity) of the population.
The two tasks are isomorphic systems, governed by the same
equation: velocityt+1 = velocityt +C × (midpoint− position)+ F,
where C is a constant, and F is the force that the participant strate-
gically adds. There is a rigorous analogy inwhich the ball’s position
corresponds to the size of the population, the velocity of the ball
corresponds to the year-to-year change in population, and turning
on the fan corresponds to initiating a media campaign. Partici-
pants demonstrated sensitivity to these correspondences because
they solved population problems more quickly when they were
preceded by a congruent version of the ball task. That is,when both
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tasks involved stabilize goals, or when both tasks involved extrem-
itize goals, solutions were found more quickly than when one task
required stabilization while the other required extremitization.
Interestingly, positive transfer between congruent simulations
was found even when participants did not see any connection
between the simulations, and could not correctly draw the cor-
respondences listed in the previous paragraph. Similarly, when
the correspondences were explicitly pointed out to participants,
this did not increase the difference between congruent and incon-
gruent conditions when performing the transfer task. In fact, the
advantage of congruent over incongruent simulations was equally
large when participants did versus did not demonstrate an under-
standing of the valid correspondences between scenarios. The
observed transfer seems to be mediated by implicit priming, rather
than strategic application of explicit schemas. The transfer also
appears to be perceptually grounded because swapping the side of
the fan from the left side (facing right) to the right side (facing left)
eliminated transfer. Our interpretation of this effect is that people
naturally understand population as a variable that goes from small
values on the left to large values on the right, recruiting space to
understand the numeric variable of population. Transfer is found
only when the spatial relations in the ball scenario naturally align
with the spatial interpretation of population.
The observed successes and failures of transfer across the ball
and population scenarios point to both the power and fragility
of perceptually grounded representations. These representations
have the power to bridge across scenarios from different domains
and with different interfaces, graphical elements, and timings.
However, they are also fragile in that they depend upon the preser-
vation of spatial relations that are not intrinsic to the underlying
formal equations. The answer provided by these experiments to
the question “If cognition is inherently grounded in perception,
then how can connections be made between superﬁcially dissimi-
lar domains?” is that people naturally and automatically translate
scenarios that are not directly spatial into spatial representations,
and perceptual priming can occur between these transformed rep-
resentations. In fact, perceptual priming can provide a vehicle for
transfer evenwhenmore explicit, strategic avenues to transfer, such
as abstract schemas (Gick and Holyoak, 1983; Detterman, 1993)
or mathematical formulae (Ross, 1987) fail. Perceptual priming is
effective for linking superﬁcially dissimilar situations because peo-
ple are habitually reinterpreting situations and translating them
into (recently) familiar, frequently spatial, representations.
While the observed transfer apparently derives from spatial and
dynamic representations, transfer is not always maximized by pre-
senting a situation with its most intuitive embodiment. In fact,
Byrge and Goldstone (2011) provide evidence that transfer from
the ball to population situation is fostered by decoupling one’s
manual interaction with the ball simulation from its underlying
resonance dynamic. The relatively unintuitive act of moving a
switch to the left to make the fan blow rightwards results in bet-
ter transfer to the population than when one’s manual direction of
motion is congruent with the fan’s direction of force. The problem
with incorporating highly intuitive perceptions and actions into
a simulation is that people’s knowledge of the simulations may
become too closely tied to these groundings. If the subsequent
situation does not share these groundings, then an opportunity
for transfer may be missed. This result is consistent with ear-
lier results showing that idealized, but still spatial, representations
can produce particularly transferable knowledge by loosening the
dependency between one’s understanding of the principle and
one’s appreciation of the particular training domain (Goldstone
and Sakamoto, 2003; Son et al., 2008; Son and Goldstone, 2009).
Together with results suggesting that some action congruity effects
are mediated by subjective construals rather than low-level bodily
actions (Markman and Brendl, 2005), these results speak against
naïvely assuming that more intuitive embodied representations
will always yield superior transfer.
OTHER CASES OF GROUNDED BUT SUPERFICIALLY DISTANT
CONNECTIONS BEING MADE
The above case study of cross-situational transfer that is grounded
but nonetheless distant is not altogether unique. Other researchers
have found examples of implicit transfer between structurally
related situations despite a lack of conscious appreciation of the
connection between the situations. People can solve a problem
involving an “inhibition” strategy more quickly when another
superﬁcially dissimilar problem requiring inhibition was seen the
previous day, even when they do not report noticing the rela-
tionship between the tasks (Schunn and Dunbar, 1996). Likewise,
Gross and Greene (2007) have reported that the global structural
relationships within a set of items (e.g., transitive or transverse
relationships)may be transferred to a new setwithout participants’
awareness. As a ﬁnal example, structural relations involving rela-
tive clauses and scoping have been shown to transfer from math-
ematics equations to written sentences (Scheepers et al., 2011).
Transfer across these kinds of situations have been modeled by
relational priming using automatic spreading activation in neural
networks (Kokinov and Petrov, 2001; Leech et al., 2008). Some
results suggest that relational priming is not always automatic,
but rather requires that people engage in cognitive processing
that is sensitive to relations (Spellman et al., 2001). In any case,
these situations provide examples of transfer across apparently
dissimilar entities that reveal natural ways for people to construe
their world. As with the earlier ball–population example, a cross-
situation connection is forged because it does not require the
cognizer to explicitly put the connection into words or equations,
but rather only requires the same, grounded system to be recruited
in different situations.
Another example of this generalization-by-conservation-of-
systems mechanism is Hills et al. (2008, 2010) study of exploration
and exploitation actions. They hypothesized that many situations
fundamentally feature a decision about how much to explore new
options versus exploit the options previously explored, and that
there could be transfer across tasks that involve similar choice
points along this tradeoff. To test this, they gave participants an ini-
tial task requiring them to forage for spatially distributed resources
that were either clumped in discrete clusters or scattered. In a
second task, participants came up with as many words as pos-
sible by rearranging sets of letters, exchanging old sets for new
when they believed that they had effectively exhausted the poten-
tial words from their current set. Participants who foraged for
distributed resources tended to exchange letter sets more often
than participants who foraged for clustered resources, consistent
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with the idea that training in a task that promotes exploration
leads people to more exploratory behavior in a second task. Hills
et al. speculate that this cross-task transfer may be mediated by
dopamine. When clustered resources are present in the foraging
task, then dopamine may be released as regions of highly con-
centrated resources are found. Dopamine is associated with an
increased tendency to exploit currently known options. If this
is the case, then the observed cross-task priming may be due to
increased levels of dopamine in the clustered resources condition
that simply remain active during the word formation task, leading
to greater perseveration with a given letter set (exploiting known
options). By this account, even without participants consciously
appreciating that both tasks involve decisions to explore or exploit
(post-experimental interviews indicated that participants did not
explicitly make this connection), neural underpinnings are sensi-
tive to the amount of exploration and exploitation required for
a task, and transfer is simply a form of priming via shared task
requirements.
Regardless of whether the dopaminergic hypothesis is correct,
this form of explanation provides a general template for how
grounded and embodied accounts of cognition can nonetheless
produce surprisingly far transfer. Transfer can seem far to us
because we do not have privileged access to the primitive com-
ponents and parameters underlying our cognitive processes. Our
conscious reﬂection prominently featureswords and justiﬁcations.
However, the actual mechanisms that allow us to solve problems
presented in computer simulations, recognize that a problem can
be solved be inhibition, and decide whether to gamble on a new
set of letters may feature other cognitive components. In particu-
lar, these components may be more perceptual, spatial, embodied,
and diffuse than our reﬂections suggest. In these cases, transfer
only seems far because we are biased to measure distance in terms
of verbally expressible schemas. Perception and action provide
us with unexpected connections that seem to depend on com-
plex rationales, but this is only because our expectations are based
on our consciously available justiﬁcations rather than our actual
cognitive mechanisms.
ATTENTION TO THE VISUAL OBJECTS OF MATHEMATICS
Mathematical reasoning is a good place to look for connections
between perception and high-level cognition. Mathematics is per-
haps the pinnacle of cognitive abstraction. Mathematicians, even
more so than physicists and computer scientists, strive to develop
theories for increasingly general domains, covering more super-
ordinate categories, and for more universal cases. Any particular
mathematical tool, say combinatorics, can be applied to countless
domains, ranging from bathroom tiling to lotteries. Much of this
generality comes from the application of symbol systems, such as
variables, equations, set theory, and predicate logic. These symbol
systems confer on their user an ability to transcend the details of a
particular domain. Given the critical role that symbol systems play
in granting a cognizer distance from a domain, it is understand-
able that researchers have contrasted symbolic cognition from
embodied cognition (Lakoff and Nuñez, 2000).
Yet, it is also worth remembering that symbol systems are phys-
ical themselves (Newell and Simon, 1976). This is especially true
for external symbol systems such asmathematical notation. Rather
than pitting symbolic processing versus perceptually grounded
processes, we have found it productive to understand symbolic
processing via perceptually grounded processes. Mathematical
notation has changed over the millennia to be easily processed
by humans (Cajori, 1928), but in addition, people change over
the course of their lifetimes to more effectively manipulate and
process mathematical notations. This latter, human, adaptation
provides an excellent example of bridging perception and cogni-
tion by adapting perception to ﬁt the needs of cognition that is
engaged in symbolic processing.
In one line of experiments, we have studied how attentional
processes are trained to facilitate algebraic reasoning (Goldstone
et al., 2010). In particular, in algebra, there is an established
convention of order of operations such that 3 + 4× 5 equals 23
[3+ (4× 5)] rather than 35 [(3+ 4)× 5]. The mnemonic PED-
MAS provides some of this order, with parenthesis – exponen-
tiation – division and multiplication – addition and subtraction
operations ordered from highest to lowest precedence. This formal
system of operation precedence can be memorized and explic-
itly invoked when doing mathematics. However, applying explicit
rules like this makes strong demands on memory and executive
control. A cognitively less strenuous alternative is simply to train
our visual attention in a manner that honors order of precedence
without explicitly following a rule that speciﬁes the order. In fact,
people train their visual attention processes to give higher priority
to notational operators that have higher precedence. The operator
for multiplication, “×,” attracts attention more so than does the
notational symbol for the lowerprecedence additionoperator,“+.”
People who know algebra show earlier and longer eye ﬁxations to
“×”s than “+”s in the context of math problems (Landy et al.,
2008). Even when participants do not have to solve mathematical
problems, their attention is automatically drawn toward the “×”s.
When simply asked to determine what the center operator is for
expressions like “4 × 3+ 5× 2,” participants’ attention is diverted
to the peripheral “×,”s as indicated by their inaccurate responses
compared to “4+ 3+ 5+ 2” trials (Goldstone et al., 2010). The
distracting inﬂuence of the peripheral operators is asymmetric
because responding “×” to “4+ 3× 5+ 2” is signiﬁcantly easier
than responding “+” in “4× 3+ 5× 2.” That is, the operator for
multiplication wins over the operator for addition in the compe-
tition for attention. This is not simply due to speciﬁc perceptual
properties of “×” and “+” because similar asymmetries are found
when participants are trained with novel operators with orders
of precedence that are counterbalanced. The results suggest that
a person’s attention becomes automatically deployed to where it
should be deployed to get them to act in accordance with the
formal order of precedence in mathematics.
BLIND AND MYOPIC FLAILING
Thus far, our argument has been that cognitive processes grounded
in perception and action can still lead to surprisingly distant
connections being made, because our sense of surprise is dispro-
portionately based on our explicit rationales. Furthermore, we
train our perceptual processes so that they better serve the needs
of high-level cognition. The ability of our perceptual system to
support far or “smart” transfer is further enhanced because of this
training.
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At this point, we must dispel a certain tension between the two
planks of this argument. On the one hand, we are arguing that
we do not have privileged access to the perceptual and grounded
processes that underlie our own cognition, and sowe do not realize
that seemingly dissimilar ball and population simulations intrinsi-
cally involve similar force- and space-based representations,or that
foraging for spatial resources and ﬁnding words involve similar
processes that mediate the explore–exploit tradeoff. On the other
hand, we are also arguing that we train our perceptual processes
to achieve apparently more sophisticated outcomes. A critic might
well press us to say, “Which way is it? Do you think we have access
to the perceptual processes that underlie our cognition? If not,
how can we adjust them?”
In defending our simultaneous assertion of both claims, we
begin by distinguishing two senses of “so that” in our argument
that “we selectively improve our perceptual abilities so that the
tasks that we need to perform are performed better.” By one inter-
pretation, “so that”means “with the intention that,” implying that
we strategically alter our perceptual abilities. By the second inter-
pretation,“so that”means “with the end result that,” implying that
our perceptual abilities are altered naturally through an automatic,
non-conscious process. Our primary claim is meant in the spirit
of this latter interpretation, although we shall later return to the
ﬁrst interpretation.
BLIND FLAILING
There is strong evidence from the ﬁeld of perceptual learning
that points to the importance of a learner’s goal on perceptual
adaptation. Granted, goals are not everything. Even perceptual
information that is irrelevant to a task can become sensitized
(Watanabe et al., 2001), even if this information is in the visual
periphery and below the threshold for conscious detection (Seitz
and Watanabe, 2005). However, there is at least as strong evidence
that what is learned and how efﬁciently it is learned depends on the
observer’s task and goal. Even when sensitivity to a line orientation
appears to have a relatively early locus of change, in that it does
not transfer strongly across eyes or visual regions, it nonetheless
depends on the observer’s goals (Shiu and Pashler, 1992). Per-
ceptual sensitization to the orientation of a line is much more
robust when it is relevant for the task than when it is irrelevant.
When observers are given the same stimuli in two conditions,
but are required to make ﬁne, subordinate-level categorizations
in one condition and coarser, basic-level categorizations in the
other, then greater selectivity of cortical regions implicated in
object processing is found in the former condition (Gillebert et al.,
2008). As a ﬁnal example, perceptual discriminations are easier to
make at boundaries between important categories for an observer,
such as between a/p/and/b/phoneme that would be important for
distinguishing “pats” from “bats.” Evidence for this “categorical
perception” effect from training studies and cross-linguistic com-
parisons indicates that it is not just perceptual sensitivities that
are driving the categories, but rather the acquired categories are
also driving perceptual sensitivities (Goldstone and Hendrickson,
2010).All of these studies show that we get better atmaking exactly
the perceptual discriminations that help us do what we want to do.
A conservative interpretation of these results is that percep-
tions are changing with the end result that performance improves.
Strategic changes need not be implicated to account for the
improvements. A mechanism that involves only random varia-
tion plus selection sufﬁces. The effective strengths of neuronal
connections are constantly varying. If a random change causes
important discriminations to be made with increasing efﬁciency,
then the changes can be preserved and extended. If not, the
changes will not be made permanent. There may be other more
goal-directed processes of neuronal change, but simple random
variation with reinforcement that may be internally generated is
all that is needed to systematically improve perceptual systems.
Although apparently inefﬁcient and “stupid,” the “blind ﬂailing”
of random variation plus selection is surprisingly powerful. It fea-
tures prominently in the theory of neuronal selection (Edelman,
1987), and the development of perception and action systems. In
a literal application of ﬂailing, infants often ﬂail their arms around
while learning to control them (Smith andThelen, 1993). The ﬂails
that are relatively effective in moving the arms where desired are
reinforced, allowing an infant to gradually ﬁne-tune their motor
control.
The blind ﬂailing observed during perceptual learning can be
fruitfully compared to the role of randomness in genetic algo-
rithms. Genetic algorithms mimic some aspects of natural evo-
lution to solve high-dimensional and difﬁcult search problems
by employing random variation and selection (Holland, 1975;
Mitchell, 1996). A pool of random candidate solutions is initial-
ized by encoding solutions in the chromosome of individuals. The
ﬁtness of each of individuals’ solution is assessed and then, a new
generation of solutions is formed by recombining, and adding
random mutations to, the previous generations’ solutions. Over
several generations, genetic algorithms are often able to produce
close-to-optimal solutions to difﬁcult search problems.We are not
arguing that genetic algorithms provide, in general, an accurate
account of human cognition. Rather, we introduce genetic algo-
rithms as a strong example of what blind ﬂailing can achieve by
way of macroscopically systematic progress.
For our current purposes, the important feature of genetic algo-
rithms is that manipulations at one level, the chromosome of an
individual solution, are then tested at a higher level that is effec-
tively blind to the speciﬁc chromosomal changes that have been
made. Selections of individuals are made on the basis of the results
of these higher level tests. For example, a genetic algorithm might
be applied to solving the traveling salesperson problem (TSP) for
a given arrangement of destinations, such that the destinations
are visited in a sequence that minimizes the total distance of the
journey. Solutions could be encoded in an individual’s chromo-
some as the sequence of destinations, such as “1 2 3 4 5 6” or
“6 4 5 2 3 1.” Mutations could involve swapping pairs of des-
tinations, transforming “6 4 5 2 3 1” into “4 6 5 2 3 1.” Each
solution can be assigned a ﬁtness deﬁned as the total path distance,
assuming that the distances between every pair of destinations is
known.
Importantly, a system like this evolves ﬁtter low-level chromo-
somal representations based on some other system’s (e.g., the eval-
uator of ﬁtness) feedback,without ever having an explicitmapping
of how those low-level representations produce a good high-level
result. For the TSP, it is easy to point to exactly such a mapping –
namely the function that takes a sequence of destinations and
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produces a total distance. However, in this case, the mapping is
possessed by only one system – the high-level evaluation. More
generally, the mapping between low-level chromosomes and high-
level evaluations may be opaque or non-existent. When a male
peacock is selected for its ability to attract females, then the map-
ping between the chromosome’s coding of the male’s body and
its environmental ﬁtness is not possessed by any single system,
and is highly non-linear if it exists at all. Despite the potentially
unknown/unknowable status of the mapping, it is nonetheless
possible to evolve increasingly ﬁt peacocks andTSP solutions. Sim-
ilarly, blind ﬂailing in the form of random changes to perceptual
systems, combined with feedback on the changes’ outcomes that is
used to shape selection, can lead to systematic improvement to our
perceptual processes. Both natural and artiﬁcial evolution give us
strong precedents for the idea that short-term, blind ﬂailing can
lead to systematic improvement over a longer time course. Even if
we completely lacked the ability to strategically reﬁne our percep-
tion, our perceptual systems could still reliably adapt to become
more congruent with the needs of high-level cognition.
MYOPIC FLAILING
A conspicuous disanalogy between perceptual learning and evo-
lutionary algorithms is that perceptual learning occurs within
sentient agents. There is no strategic agent that looks down upon
evolutionary processes with the aim of increasing their efﬁciency
by directing evolution in particular directions1. However, in the
case of people, we may be interested in tweaking our perceptual
system so that the tasks we need to perform are performed better.
Now,“so that” is being used in its other sense of “with the intention
that.” Merely desiring that our perceptual systems perform better
provides no guarantee that they will do so. In fact, there are argu-
ments suggesting that they will not cooperate with our intentions.
Within cognitive science it is common to argue for the cognitive
impenetrability of perception – the notion that what we perceive
is not inﬂuenced by our beliefs, goals, or experiences (Pylyshyn,
2006). A classic example is that the two lines of Müeller-Lyer illu-
sion continue to look unequal even after we have just measured
them, and hence we know that they are the same length. The claim
for the cognitive impenetrability of perception is consistent with
the notion of perceptual modules – that perceptual processes are
generally structured such that we have access to their outputs, but
no ability to adjust their internal workings (Fodor, 1983).
However, humans are impressively resourceful, and we have
found a number of ways of affecting our perception at many
different levels of processing. People purposefully“hack”their per-
ceptual systems in order to facilitate performance. Often times,
these hacks are still ﬂailing, but they are not completely blind,
merely myopic. To better appreciate the resourceful with which
people manage to change their perceptual systems in order to
accomplish tasks that they would have difﬁculty accomplishing
otherwise, we outline a variety of pertinent cases. These cases
illustrate mechanisms by which we alter, adjust, or adjust our
perceptual abilities due to our intentional actions.
1However, in the case of genetic algorithms, there is current research interest in sys-
tems that guide evolution by creating new heuristics that will then constrain future
ﬁtness evaluation (Burke et al., 2009).
(A) Changing our perceptual equipment
(1) Cupping one’s hands behind one’s ear to allowus to hear
better in a particular direction.
(2) Pushing the skin around one’s eye’s to deform the eye’s
shape to make an image sharper.
(3) Clamping one’s jaws tight to make one’s ears less
sensitive to noise.
(4) Arranging our ﬁngers so as to create a small aperture in
front of our eye with the intention of creating a sharper
image of an object.
(B) Strategically employing perceptual equipment
(5) When wine tasting, sloshing the wine around one’s
mouth so that it covers more taste buds, also sucking
in a bit of air to make more molecules airborne, thus
intensifying olfactory response.
(6) In a Stroop interference task, purposefully squinting
one’s eyes to facilitate ignoring the word that the colored
ink forms.
(7) Explicitly remind oneself to assess the characteristics of
clarity, cut, caret, and color when judging the quality of
diamonds.
(8) Looking at a dim star not directly but in the periphery
of one’s eyes, where the concentration of rods is greater,
and hence one’s ability to detect faint light is greater.
(9) When trying to see a pass-through rather than bounce
event in the ambiguous apparent motion sequence
shown in Figure 2, track with one’s eyes a ball moving
persistently from left to right.
(C) Long-term efforts to accelerate perceptual learning
(10) Self-exposure to important stimuli. For instance, the
communal collection, publication, and distribution of
sets of “interesting” and “non-interesting” results from
FIGURE 2 | Five frames of an ambiguous apparent motion sequence.
Two balls can be either seen passing through each other or as bouncing off
one another.
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cloud chamber experiments, in order to train new
observers (Galison, 1997).
(11) When trying to learn the distinction between monarch
and viceroy butterﬂies, explicitly juxtaposing pairs of
the butterﬂies to exploit the beneﬁt of simultaneous
comparison and contrast.
(12) Giving oneself spaced, rather than massed, practice
when trying to learn the difference between two species
of mushrooms, so as to increase the impact on learning
of each presentation.
(13) Purposefully exposing oneself to different speakers
and syllables when trying to learn a difﬁcult speech
sound discrimination such as high-rising versus low-
dipping tones in Mandarin for native English speakers
or/r/versus/l/for native Japanese speakers.
(14) Training baseball batters to read numbers painted on
baseballs to improve their ball tracking ability.
(15) Placing paintings on the walls of a baby’s room if
one wishes for the baby to later have an easier time
identifying and distinguishing the paintings.
(D) Creating new perceptual objects to emphasize important
properties
(16) UsingVenn diagrams to determine the different possible
combinations for three binary variables.
(17) Rewriting a math equation, spacing notational element
further apart if they have a relatively low order of
precedence, to promote correctly solving it.
(18) Drawing a graph to better understand the nature of a
three-way interaction from a psychology experiment.
(E) Creating physical tools to allow us to perceive better
(19) Creating a telescope to view other planets.
(20) Putting ink on a ball before rolling it, so as to better
inspect its trajectory.
(21) Creating a cloud chamber to view the trajectories of
sub-atomic particles.
(22) Installing a cochlear implant to restore hearing to a deaf
individual.
To be sure, not all of these examples are violations of cognitive
impenetrability. Examples 11–13 are cases of an observer’s goals
inﬂuencing their perceptual categorizations. It could be argued
that they are not relevant, though, to cognitive penetration because
the goals are long-term rather than acting on-line during the
processing of a single stimulus. We would argue, however, that
these kinds of perceptual changes are more inﬂuential exactly
because they are long-term and chronic, and the perceptual change
becomes automatic once acquired (Shiffrin and Lightfoot, 1997).
If we restrict the inﬂuence of goals to only interactive and on-line
inﬂuences, then we systematically ignore the large class of situ-
ations in which we change the feed-forward characteristics of a
perceptual system to make it more efﬁcient for meeting our goals.
Examples like 9 are interesting because motion perception has
been singled out as one of the strongest cases for a modular-
ized perceptual system, with well-deﬁned computational accounts
(Ullman, 1979) and localized brain regions (e.g., area MT). The
fact that one’s goals can change the motion that is subjectively
perceived is compatible with motion perception being highly
modular. Either people can systematically adjust the inputs to their
perceptual apparatus to alter the computation of motion, or the
parameters governing the computation of the object correspon-
dences underlying motion perception (Dawson, 1991) can them-
selves be tuned by goals. There are numerous examples of such
tuning being necessary to account for the inﬂuences of knowledge
and context on motion perception (Palmer, 1999). Just because
something is highly modular does not mean that it performs its
function without variation or context-sensitivity. In the same way
that a function or subroutine can take arguments that affect the
computations performed within it, the computations within even
a completely opaque perceptual black-box can be modulated, and
if the perceptual module is to be responsive and robust, it must be.
The mechanisms described above for changing perceptions
have been organized into ﬁve categories. The intention is not
so much to draw sharp distinctions between these categories as
to draw parallels across the categories. For example, we suspect
that few people would naturally consider the mechanisms of (E)
(except 21) to be perceptual changes at all. However, we see these
mechanisms to be comparable to some of the mechanisms of (A).
Cupping one’s hands over one’s ears seems importantly similar
to building a telescope. They both extend the normal range of
one’s sensory organ. It seems less important that one extension is
achieved by natural, bodily means, while the other by an inorganic
tool. Likewise, there are strong parallels between the mechanisms
of (D) and (E). We believe that creating perceptual tools like Venn
and Feynman diagrams can be understood as deeply related to
creating physical tools that extend our sensory organs (Landy and
Goldstone, 2005). A powerful new spatial representation changes
how things look just as surely as a microscope does. Compelling
examples have been empirically described for how diagrams help
thinking by promoting new ways of perceiving. Providing a sta-
tic diagram may help people see what two seemingly dissimilar
instantiations of a“convergence schema”share (Gick and Holyoak,
1983), and if a dynamic animation showing convergence is pro-
vided, then even greater transfer is achievable (Pedone et al., 2001).
Cheng’s (2002) analysis of diagrams points to a suite of desirable
properties of diagrams that allow them to serve as effective “cog-
nitive prostheses”: (1) they combine globally homogeneous with
locally heterogeneous representations of concepts, (2) they inte-
grate alternative perspectives, (3) they allow for expressions to be
easily manipulated, and (4) they support compact and uniform
procedures.
A new spatial representation does not always need to be physi-
cally instantiated to prove effective, once it has been internalized.
The beneﬁts of Venn diagrams, once understood, can be secured
even when they are only internally generated. As useful as it is to
ofﬂoad cognitive tasks onto the environment (Clark, 2009), it is
often equally useful to internalize physical transformations. For
example, one of the striking effects of learning the formalisms and
diagrams for Signal Detection Theory is that they can become so
well internalized that their possessor spontaneously sees connec-
tions between doctors diagnosing cancers and farmers determin-
ing which melons to ship, even when the learner does not prepare
any external representation (Son and Goldstone, 2009). More gen-
erally, one of the best hopes for schooling is that students will learn
new, habitual ways of seeing their world as a result of their formal
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education. Students will learn to see their world through the tools
they have acquired.
The term “myopic ﬂailing” is meant to be contrasted with
the “blind ﬂailing” of genetic algorithms and natural evolution.
Myopic ﬂailing conveys that people can educate their percep-
tions more efﬁciently than expected via pure random variation,
even though their manipulations are less direct and straightfor-
ward than they would be if they could access and manipulate
all aspects of the perceptual module. The classic chicken sex-
ing expertise study by Biederman and Shiffrar (1987) provides a
good context for appreciating myopic ﬂailing. In this study, novice
participants were given a single page of instructions on how to
categorize day-old baby chickens that elevated their performance
at chick sexing with photographs from slightly above chance to
approximately that of experts with 24 years of experience sexing
chicks. The novice’s impressive improvement with less than an
hour of training is striking. It is highly unlikely that the novice’s
improvement is mostly due to perceptual learning. Most cases
of perceptual learning are characterized by slow and protracted
learning over the course of weeks or years (Shiffrin and Light-
foot, 1997; Goldstone, 1998). Perceptual learning is an example
par excellence of the adage that “wisdom can not be taught.” One
cannot simply read a text-based book that has no illustrations
if one wishes to become an expert dog show judge, gymnastics
coach, wine taster, or umpire. One needs experiences to change
one’s perceptual system.
However, it would also be a mistake to completely ignore the
beneﬁcial inﬂuence of instructional words and verbal justiﬁca-
tions. In the case of the chick sexing study, the rapidity of learning
suggests that the novice participants already had the perceptual
building blocks ﬁrmly in place needed to understand and follow
the instructions,which featured phrases such as“look for two large
cylindrical side lobes near the bottom of each picture” and “Male
chicken genitals tend to look round and foolish like a ball or water-
melon.” This is a case of adaptation that is so clear-sighted that
it does not qualify as “ﬂailing” at all. In many cases of perceptual
training, the accompanying words are not so directly actionable,
but neither are they completely irrelevant. These are the cases
where perceptual adaptation is best understood as operating via
myopic ﬂailing. Consider, for example, a radiologist instructing
her students on how to distinguish between sarcoidosis and pul-
monary alveolar proteinosis by looking for ﬁssural beading versus
a diffuse mosaic ground glass paving pattern without ﬁbrosis.
These perceptual features require months/years of training to
develop. It is unlikely that a simple page of imageless instructions
will ever sufﬁce for their instruction, and medical schools have
converged on training disease identiﬁcation through a combina-
tion of describing bodily appearances and explaining causal bodily
mechanisms. Features like “ground glass,” “ﬁbrotic,” “paving pat-
tern,” “mossy,” “ulcerated,” and “pustulated” are not immediately
understandable, and developing an operational understanding of
them practically necessitates undergoing perceptual training by
witnessing cases. However, the words are nonetheless useful for
focusing one’s attention on different aspects of a disease, such as
its spatial distribution, color, arrangement, tactile feel, and texture.
The words do not directly alter the internal workings of percep-
tual modules, but they do lead to more effective learning than
pure random selection. They provide myopic support for tuning
perceptions.
A characteristic of many forms of expertise is that the expert has
both a highly precise verbal vocabulary and an ability to percep-
tually parse objects from their domain in a coherent and expres-
sive manner. These two characteristics are correlated because, we
believe, each informs the development of the other. In most cases,
words cannot replace experience for teaching perceptual skills, but
they can facilitate perceptual skill learning, as anybody who has
tried to learn to distinguish poisonous from edible mushrooms
in a completely word-less, instruction-less, and inductive fashion
would attest (in the unlikely event that they lived long enough to
do so).
CONCLUSION
There is little, if any, gap between perception and high-level cogni-
tion because perceptual systems adapt to ﬁt the needs of high-level
cognition. These adaptations may be either the result of random
variation or more directed tuning. A person gaining experience
with the world also acquires more knowledge about how low-level,
physical transformations affect high-level cognitive outcomes. For
this reason, blind ﬂailing generally gives way to varying degrees
of guided tuning through learning. Babies have difﬁculty even
tracing the edges of a high-contrast object with their eyes. A psy-
chophysicist studying color can separately isolate the saturation
and brightness levels of an object. Most adults fall somewhere
in between these two points, having intermediate-level access to
visual properties. Once a visual property has been isolated, it can
then be strategically tuned. Before a person has learned to iso-
late saturation from brightness, it is difﬁcult or impossible for
them to selectively attend to just one of these dimensions (Gold-
stone and Steyvers, 2001). Afterward, they have strategic control
over which dimensions they will use for a particular purpose.
Thus, people not only learn to attend to perceptual dimensions
to address their needs; they also learn how to learn to attend to
dimensions. This meta-learning represents the transition from a
relatively uncontrolled, random search for a method to improve
perceptual processing to a relatively controlled and guide done.
Perceptual learning, and perceptual learning learning, serve to
increase the sophistication of our perceptual processes. The result
is that people’s perceptual processes can support what appear to
be long-distance connections requiring formal abstractions. The
primary advantage of long-distance connections that are based
on perceptual rather than formal symbolic processes is that they
are more likely to exist! Formalisms provided by mathematics and
logic are typically cognitively inert unless they are grounded in
perceptual processes. They are inert in the sense that people are
unlikely to realize that two situations are governed by the same
formalism, unless they are given a hint to connect the situations.
As such, these connections are not likely to be made through
application of formalisms.
The promise of making connections based on learned per-
ceptual properties is that the connections can be automatically
forged because they are perceptual, but they can nonetheless be
sophisticated because they are learned. Strategies and goals shape
perceptual learning via “myopic ﬂailing” (see Materials and Meth-
ods 10–15), but importantly, once the learning has transpired,
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it is automatically deployed during perception. Even when per-
ceptions cannot be semi-permanently changed via learning, the
other methods describe ways of manipulating perceptions so as to
overcome some of their limitations.
This perspective on achieving sophisticated reasoning through
perceptual manipulation can be contrasted with the Quine an
approach of trumping perception by higher level reasoning, rules,
and the application of deﬁnitions. In practice, both kinds of
processes must occur. Determining the causes and consequences
of each process would constitute a fertile research program, with
perhaps even neural correlates. For example, for cases in which
perceptual processes are trumped by rules, we might expect
frontal cortex to exhibit heightened activity, and to actively inhibit
more posterior perceptual regions. In contrast, when perceptual
processes are adapted to subserve formal thought, then poste-
rior cortical regions may assume particular importance. This
decomposition into modules is roughly compatible with empir-
ically observed neural supercessions –cases in which controlled,
initial performance is governed by different neural populations
than subsequent automatic processing (Procyk et al., 2000). For
example, when a monkey ﬁrst learns to associate a novel stim-
ulus with a response, some cells with in the supplementary eye
ﬁelds (SEF) of the dorsal–medial surface of the frontal lobe are
highly active, but become decreasingly active with repetition of
the stimulus. Other cells show the opposite tendency, becoming
increasingly active as the response to a novel stimulus is learned
(Chen and Wise, 1995). This pattern of complimentary con-
trolled and automatic processes ﬁts the above developed account
in that we have argued that controlled processes operate to make
themselves obsolescent by modifying perception over a protracted
course of training. While our account is similar in some ways
to theories positing a split between rule-based versus automatic,
association-based reasoning (Sloman, 1996), our account focuses
on the development of new perceptual processes rather than sim-
ply association learning, and points to ways in ways in which
our rule-based system guides and informs the construction of
perceptual processes.
One advantage of training over trumping perception is that
the opportunities provided by rich and nuanced interpretations
available from a highly evolved and trained perceptual system are
not relinquished. As a consequence of the automatic and strategic
changes to perception, people can perceive connections between
balls and city growth (they can both be resonance systems), toilets
and hare–lynx populations (they are both negative feedback sys-
tems), and a general surrounding a fortress and removing a tumor
by concentrating multiple lasers at the tumor (they are both exam-
ple of converging forces to overcome an entity). Once bridges are
built between these prime facie distant but deeply related situa-
tions, knowledge and inferences can freely move from one to the
other. Connections can be made between situations that, at ﬁrst,
may not appear related at all, because trained appearances can go
far beyond ﬁrst appearances.
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